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I. Legislative and Regulatory Developments 
This year the State of Oklahoma passed a law about the ownership of 
produced water, and the Oklahoma Corporation Commission issued new 
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regulations about production rates for gas wells and when operators may 
shut in their wells to prevent waste. 
A. State Legislative Developments 
1. Ownership of Produced Water 
On May 19, 2020, SB 1875 was signed into law by Gov. Kevin Stitt 
creating the Oil and Gas Produced Water and Waste Recycling and Reuse 
Act (“Act”) to be codified at Section 86.6 of Title 52 of the Oklahoma 
Statutes. The Act designates who owns and is responsible for produced 
water and waste from oil and natural gas drilling and production operations.  
The Act states that before its extraction from the ground, subterranean 
water, including its constituent elements, is the property of the owner of the 
surface estate, and is subject to the right of the mineral owner or 
the oil and gas lessee of the mineral owner, or both, to extract the water as 
is reasonably necessary for, or incident to, the exploration and extraction of 
the oil and gas.  The Act states that unless provided otherwise by an order 
of the Corporation Commission or other legally binding document, the 
operator and nonoperators of an oil and gas well are the owners of the 
produced water and waste extracted from the ground through the borehole 
of the oil or gas well, have the right to use, possess, handle, dispose of, 
transfer, sell, process, recycle, reuse or treat the produced water and waste, 
and are entitled to the proceeds for any of the uses of the produced water. 
The Act includes an exception if oil and gas produced water and waste is 
processed for the extraction of the constituent elements for commercial 
purposes, the produced water and waste shall be considered brine under the 
Oklahoma Brine Development Act and subject to the provisions of that act, 
including the entitlement to and sharing of proceeds. The Act is effective 
November 1, 2020. 
2. Limitation on local Controls on Utility Service Connections 
On May 19, 2020, Gov. Kevin Stitt signed HB 3619 into law amending 
Okla. Stat. tit. 11, § 14-107(2020), to prohibit a city, town or county from 
adopting real estate development, building or construction ordinances, rules, 
or codes restricting or prohibiting connections to the facilities of utility 
providers. This measure also prohibits discrimination in the adoption of rules 
or codes against one or more utility providers based upon the nature or source 
of the utility service provided.  The goal of the legislation is to prohibit local 
governments from banning certain utility connections, such as natural gas 
hookups. The amendment is effective November 1, 2020.  
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B. State Regulatory Developments 
1. Production Rates for Unallocated Gas Wells 
On March 5, 2020, by Order No. 709553, the Oklahoma Corporation 
Commission adjusted the maximum permitted rates of production for 
unallocated natural gas wells.  The order sets a proration formula for the 
period between April 1, 2020, and September 30, 2020, that requires 
operators to limit an unallocated gas well’s absolute open flow to 50%, 
down from the prior rate of 65%, or to cap its maximum allowable 
production at 2 million cubic feet per day (mmcf/d), whichever is greater.   
2. Well Shut In to Prevent Waste.   
On April 22, 2020, the Oklahoma Corporation Commission issued an 
emergency order providing that to help prevent waste, protection of correlative 
rights, and to optimize production, operators/producers may shut-in or curtail oil 
production from wells where they determine such action is necessary and 
warranted to prevent economic waste.  The order was to remain effective for 
ninety (90) days from April 17, 2020, but was superseded by Interim Order, 
Order No. 711992, entered June 3, 2020.  In the Interim Order, the Commission 
orders that to help prevent waste, protection of correlative rights, and to optimize 
production, producers may shut-in or curtail oil production from wells where the 
producer deems such action necessary based on their determination that 
economic waste is occurring.  The Commission further ordered that during shut-
in or curtailment of such wells, the wells shall be deemed as producing under 
Commission Rules and Regulations.  The Interim Order is to remain in effect 
until the matter is reopened on August 10, 2020. 
II. Judicial Developments 
This year Oklahoma state courts examined the Surface Damages Act and 
homestead conveyances between spouses.  Also, the federal court for the 
Western District of Oklahoma tackled how Oklahoma Corporation 
Commission orders affect lease provisions and joint operating agreements. 
A. Supreme Court Cases 
Talen Paul Hobson v. Cimarex Energy Co., 2019 OK 58, 453 P.3d 482 
How does Oklahoma’s Surface Damages Act (the “SDA”) define 
“surface owner?”  And does that definition include a vested remainderman, 
or just the life tenant?  In Hobson v. Cimarex, the Oklahoma Supreme 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
230 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 6 
  
 




Timothy Hobson, the Plaintiff’s father, owns a life estate in the surface 
estate in property in Canadian County, Oklahoma, with the remainder to his 
son, Talen Hobson, the Plaintiff.  Cimarex is a lessee in the property and 
before it drilled, Cimarex reached a surface damages agreement with the 
life tenant pursuant to the SDA.
2
 
Plaintiff then sued Cimarex and argued he is entitled to compensation 
because he is a surface owner under the SDA, and Cimarex should have 
negotiated with him.  Cimarex argued Plaintiff is a future interest owner 
and is not considered a “surface owner” under the SDA.  But if the court 
did find Plaintiff to qualify as a surface owner, then Cimarex argued he 
should look to the life tenant for recourse instead of Cimarex.
3
 
The Canadian County District Court dismissed the case with prejudice, 
finding a vested remainderman does not qualify as a surface owner under 
the SDA.  The Court of Civil Appeals reversed, ruling the SDA deals with 
ownership as opposed to possession.
4
 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court explained this case depended on how the 
SDA defines “surface owner,” or “the owner or owners of record of the 
surface of the property on which the drilling operation is to occur.”  
However, the SDA does not further define “owner.”
5
 
Therefore, the court looked to the ordinary meaning of owner found in 
Black’s Law Dictionary: “[s]omeone who has the right to possess, use, and 
convey something.”
6
  Looking to the United States Supreme Court, 
ownership does not always mean absolute dominion, but where the property 
is private, the owner retains more dominion.
7
 
Then the court explained how Plaintiff’s vested remainder will only 
become possessory when his father, the life tenant, dies.
8
  Since Plaintiff 
does not currently own a possessory interest in the surface estate, the SDA 
only requires Cimarex to negotiate with the person holding a current 
possessory interest, the life tenant.
9
 
                                                                                                             
 1. Talen Paul Hobson v. Cimarex Energy Co., 2019 OK 58, 453 P.3d 482. 
 2. Id. ¶ 2. 
 3. Id. ¶ 3. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. ¶ 7. 
 6. Id. ¶ 9. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. ¶ 10. 
 9. Id. ¶ 13. 
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As support for its ruling, the court cited McCrabb v. Chesapeake Energy 
Corp., where the appellate court ruled an operator must negotiate a surface 
damages agreement with all tenants in common.  All tenants in common 
have a current possessory interest, unlike a vested remainderman.
10
  
Therefore, the court held that although the SDA’s definition of surface 
owner is ambiguous, Plaintiff did not qualify as such an owner and Cimarex 
did not have to negotiate for surface damages with anyone but the life 
tenant. 
B. Appellate Activity 
In the Matter of the Estate of Hyer, 2020 OK CIV APP 31, 2020 WL 
3529410 
This case explained when both spouses need not join in a deed 
conveying their homestead.  The Court of Civil Appeals ruled Okla. Stat. 
tit. 16, § 4 (2011) does not apply when one of the spouses is the grantee. 
Daniel Benjamin Hyer owned real property in Cleveland County, 
Oklahoma, prior to his marriage to Sara Beth Hyer.  During their marriage, 
Daniel deeded the property to himself and his wife as joint tenants with the 
right of survivorship.  Only Daniel signed the deed, and they lived in the 
home on the property and claimed it as their homestead until Daniel died 
about sixteen months later.
11
 
After Daniel’s death, Sara executed and filed for record, an affidavit 
claiming full ownership of the property as her husband’s surviving joint 
tenant.  However, somehow Sara knew Benjamin Hyer, Daniel’s adult son 
from a prior relationship, intended to claim partial ownership of the 
property as an heir of his father.  Therefore, Sara moved to ask the probate 
court to determine the ownership of the property.
12
 
Sara claimed the property through the joint tenancy deed.  Benjamin 
argued the deed was invalid under Okla. Stat. tit. 16, § 4 (2011) the statute 
requiring both spouses to join in a deed conveying homestead property.
13
  
The district court invalidated the deed, holding the conveyance was 
“inadequate to establish a joint tenancy for the reason that both the husband 
and wife did not execute to convey.”
14
 
                                                                                                             
 10. McCrabb v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 2009 OK CIV APP 66, ¶ 16, 216 P.3d 312, 
315. 
 11. In the Matter of the Estate of Hyer, 2020 OK CIV APP 31, ¶ 2, 2020 WL 3529410. 
 12. Id. ¶ 3. 
 13. Id. ¶ 4. 
 14. Id. ¶ 5. 
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Okla. Stat. tit. 16, § 4 (2011) states:  
No deed, mortgage, or contract affecting the homestead exempt 
by law, except a lease for a period not exceeding one (1) year, 
shall be valid unless in writing and subscribed by both husband 
and wife, if both are living and not divorced, or legally 
separated, except as otherwise provided for by law.
15
 
It is undisputed the property was the decedent’s homestead, and the deed 
was not executed by both spouses.  Therefore, the deed appears to be 
invalid based on strictly reading the statute.  However, the appellate court 




The Oklahoma Supreme Court  issued multiple rulings holding  Okla. 
Stat. tit. 16, § 4 (2011) does not apply when the deed is only between the 
spouses.
17
  In Hall v. Powell, the court held the husband “had a perfect right 
to convey the land to his wife, although he signed it by himself alone.”
18
  
The court decided a deed between spouses is not within the “spirit of the 
section, which surely cannot intend that the wife should do the vain and 
absurd thing of executing, as grantor, a deed to herself as grantee.”
19
 
In Brooks v. Butler, the Oklahoma Supreme Court validated a husband’s 
unilateral conveyance of a mortgage of the homestead to his wife.  
Focusing on the statute’s purpose, the court said: 
The manifest purpose of the foregoing constitutional provision is 
to protect the homestead interest.  The homestead interest is for 
the benefit of both the husband and the wife.  If the execution of 
the mortgage did not destroy the homestead interest the 
mortgage is valid.  It follows, therefore that when [the husband] 
executed the mortgage to the wife… there was nothing in the 
execution thereof which attempted to or did affect the homestead 
interest.  The mortgage was therefore not void under the 
foregoing constitutional or statutory provision.
20
 
In Grenard v. McMahan, a wife owned the homestead property outright, 
and  conveyed it to her husband, for life, with the remainder to her 
                                                                                                             
 15. Id. ¶ 7. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. ¶ 8. 
 18. Hall v. Powell, 1899 OK 50, 57 P. 168. 
 19. Id, quoting Harsh v. Griffin, 72 Iowa 608, 34 N.W. 441 (1887). 
 20. Brooks v. Butler, 1939 OK 132, ¶ 17, , 87 P.2d 1092, 1096. 
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daughters from a previous marriage.  The Oklahoma Supreme Court 
invalidated the deed and specifically rejected the argument the deed was 
just a conveyance between spouses.  The court held the exception for 
conveyances between spouses was valid, but the conveyance of the 
remainder estate to the wife’s daughters, i.e., third persons, took the case 
out of the exception.
21
 
While Okla. Stat. tit. 16, § 4 (2011) does require conveyances of the 
homestead to be joined by both spouses, multiple Oklahoma Supreme Court 
cases  held a spouse does not need to join as a grantor if the spouse is also 
the grantee in the instrument.  Therefore, the Court of Civil Appeals 
reversed the district court’s ruling and found the deed to be valid.
22
 
Devon Energy Production Company, L.P. v. Wyckoff,  2020 OK CIV 
APP 4, 457 P.3d 284 
A Lessor executes an oil and gas lease and strikes the warranty clause.  
The Lessee pays Lessor the bonus, and then later discovers Lessor’s 
mineral interest is already subject to a different oil and gas lease.  Can 
Lessee recover the bonus even though the lease did not include a warranty?  
In Devon v. Wyckoff, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals ruled the Lessee 
must have the opportunity to prove its case that the Lessor committed fraud 
when it executed the lease.
23
 
Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. released all of its interest in a lease.  
Afterwards, the Defendants’ attorney contacted Devon and asked if they 
were interested in leasing his clients’ approximately 400 net mineral acres 
in Section 3-20N-17W in Woodward County, Oklahoma.  The Defendants 
executed two leases to Devon, striking the warranty from both leases.  
Devon paid almost $1.8 million in bonuses to the Defendants, only to later 
learn Chesapeake released a wellbore-only interest in the Wyckoff #2-3 
well in Section 3.
24
 
Further investigation led Devon to discover a 1956 lease covering 
Section 3 and other sections  still in effect.  Production from multiple 
sections was still holding the lease, although there were no producing wells 
on Section 3 itself.  Therefore, the Defendants owned no mineral acres 
available for lease in Section 3.
25
 
                                                                                                             
 21. Grenard v. McMahan, 1968 OK 75, 441 P.2d 950. 
 22. Estate of Hyer at ¶ 14. 
 23. Devon Energy Production Company, L.P. v. Wyckoff,  2020 OK CIV APP 4, 457 
P.3d 284 
 24. Id. ¶ 2. 
 25. Id. 
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Devon filed suit and pleaded four causes of action: (1) breach of the 
implied covenant of quiet enjoyment; (2) actual and/or constructive fraud; 
(3) rescission; and (4) unjust enrichment.  The Major County District Court 
dismissed Devon’s claims for failure to state a claim on which relief can be 
granted.
26
  The district court gave no further explanation or detail. 
The appellate court explained this case relies on two cases: Peabody 
Coal Co. v. State  ex rel. Comm’rs of the Land Office, and French Energy, 
Inc. v. Alexander.
27
  In Peabody Coal, the Oklahoma Land Office executed 
a lease removing a warranty that the lessor was “seized in fee with the right 
to lease the minerals.”
28
  Essentially, the Land Office would not warrant its 
title or right to lease.  The court described the lease as a quitclaim and ruled 
the coal company took the lease at its own risk.  The court found the coal 
company could not recover any bonus or royalties from the Land Office.
29
  
The Defendants in this case argued the court should treat their leases to 
Devon as quitclaims, similar to the lease in Peabody Coal.
30
 
In French Energy, an oil and gas lease was sold at a judicial sale, and the 
minerals described in the lease were already held by production, so there 
was nothing for Alexander to convey.  The Oklahoma Supreme Court held 
French Energy was entitled to equitable relief because Alexander was 
aware of the pre-existing lease, although Alexander may not have 
understood the importance of this lease.
31
  The court ruled at the very least 
there was a mutual mistake between the parties as to whether or not 
Alexander could convey the present right to explore for oil and gas.  
Alexander would be substantially and unjustly enriched if he could keep the 
bonus money in exchange for nothing.
32
 
Regarding fraud, the court said: 
The doctrine of caveat emptor can never be invoked to perpetrate 
a fraud.  The purchaser is entitled to receive the title owned by 
the estate of the decedent at the time of his death or prior to the 
sale.  The estate will never be allowed to retain its title to the 
property and also retain the purchase price therefor.  The law 
requires the estate to part with whatever title it has in and to the 
                                                                                                             
 26. Id. ¶ 3. 
 27. Id.  4. 
 28. Peabody Coal Co. v. State ex rel. Comm’rs of the Land Office, 1992 OK CIV APP 
83, 884 P.2d 857. 
 29. Id. at 859. 
 30. Devon v. Wyckoff at ¶4. 
 31. French Energy, Inc. v. Alexander, 1991 OK 106, 818 P.2d 1234. 
 32. Id. at 1239. 
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Devon argued the Defendants knew or should have known their net 
mineral acres in Section 3 were not available to lease because they were 
still receiving royalties from a 1956 lease.  Devon claimed Defendants 
failed to disclose this information and intended Devon to rely on this 
omission.  In their pleadings, Defendants argued they told Devon they were 




Therefore, while the District Court dismissed Devon’s case for failure to 
state a claim, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded the case to 
provide Devon the opportunity to prove their fraud claim. 
C. Federal Cases 
Curtis Cory et al. v. Newfield Exploration Mid-Continent, Inc., 2020 WL 
981718 (W.D. Oklahoma 2020) 
How does an order from the Oklahoma Corporation Commission interact 
with a pooling provision in a lease?  Cory v. Newfield explained how a 




In 1980, the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (the “OCC”) issued 
Order No. 164538 establishing Section 36, Township 15 North, Range 9 
West, in Kingfisher County, Oklahoma, as a 640-acre spacing unit for gas 
and gas condensate production from the Tonkawa, Mississippi Solid, and 
Hunton common sources of supply.
36
 
Plaintiffs own the surface estate of a 160-acre tract out of Section 36.  In 
1997, Plaintiff’s predecessor executed an oil and gas lease to Defendant’s 
predecessor covering an 80-acre tract in Section 36.  The lease’s pooling 
clause provided for unit sizes up to 160 acres for an oil well and up to 640 
acres for a gas well.
37
 
On April 25, 2017, Plaintiffs contacted Defendant because they learned 
Defendant planned to drill a horizontal well in Section 36.  The Plaintiffs 
claimed the pooling clause in the 1997 lease prevented anyone from 
                                                                                                             
 33. Id. 
 34. Devon v. Wyckoff at ¶ 8. 
 35. Curtis Cory et al. v. Newfield Exploration Mid-Continent, Inc., 2020 WL 981718 
(W.D. Oklahoma 2020). 
 36. Id. at 1. 
 37. Id. 
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creating a pooled unit exceeding 160 acres for an oil well.
38
  Then on April 
27, 2017, Defendant filed an application with the OCC, requesting Section 
36 be established as a 640-acre spacing unit for oil production from the 
Mississippian, Woodford, and Hunton common sources of supply.  




On May 18, 2017, Defendant applied to the OCC for an increased 
density so it could drill an additional well under Order No. 164538.  Its 
application claimed Order No. 164538 established a 640-acre spacing unit 
for the production of oil and gas, or gas and gas condensate from the 
Mississippian common source of supply.  However, said Order did not 
cover oil production or the Mississippian.
40
 
On July 6, 2017, the OCC granted Defendant’s increased density 
application (Order No. 665651).  The OCC stated the additional well would 
be an exception to Order No. 164538.  Soon Defendant drilled an oil well 
named the Katie 1509 1H-36 well (the “Katie 1509”).
41
 
On November 1, 2018, the OCC issued an order nunc pro tunc, noting a 
scrivener’s error in Order No. 665651.  That Order should have covered the 
Mississippi Solid common source of supply instead of the Mississippian.
42
 
Then in January of 2019, Plaintiffs filed suit in the District Court in 
Kingfisher County, asking to quiet title to the leased 80 acres and claiming 
breach of contract, tortious interference with contract, and bad faith.  
Defendant removed the case to this federal court, and moved to seek partial 
judgment on the pleadings.  Plaintiffs admitted they had no claim for 




Defendant argued Plaintiffs were attempting an impermissible collateral 
attack on Order No. 164538 and Order No. 665651.  Oklahoma law 
prevents courts from allowing a collateral attack “upon the orders, rules and 
regulations of the OCC.”
44
  The term “collateral attack” has been defined as 
“an attempt to avoid, defeat, evade, or deny the force and effect of a final 
                                                                                                             
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 2. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Ladra v. New Dominion, LLC, 2015 OK 53, ¶ 11, 353 P.3d 529, 531-32. 
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order or judgment in an incidental proceeding other than by appeal, writ of 
error, certiorari, or motion for new trial.”
45
 
However, OCC orders are not completely immune from lawsuits; the 
OCC’s jurisdiction is “limited to the resolution of public rights.”
46
  State 
district courts have the jurisdiction to resolve disputes over private rights.  
“Judicial adjudication of private rights under a leasehold agreement does 
not amount to a collateral attack on an OCC order unless it would require 
the court to ‘reverse, modify, or correct’ the order.”
47
 
This court explained Plaintiffs are not attempting to reverse, modify, or 
correct an OCC order; they are trying to enforce a contractual right in an oil 
and gas lease.  Therefore, this lawsuit is not an impermissible collateral 
attack on Order No. 164538 or Order No. 665651 and this court has the 
jurisdiction to hear the case.
48
 
Moving on to Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, 
Plaintiffs claimed Defendant violated the lease’s 160-acre limit for pooled 
units with an oil well.  Defendant agreed the Katie 1509 is an oil well and it 
is being drilled on a unit larger than 160 acres.  However, Defendant argued 
it drilled the Katie 1509 under Order No. 164538 and Order No. 665651, 
and those orders overruled the spacing limitation in the lease.  Also, 
Defendant argued Plaintiffs have alleged no conduct which actually 
violated the lease’s spacing limitation.
49
 
Defendant pointed out that Paragraph 14 of the lease provided:  
Should lessee be prevented from complying with any express or 
implied covenant of this lease… by reason of… any order, rule 
or regulation of governmental authority, then while so prevented, 
lessee’s obligation to comply with such covenant shall be 




Therefore, Defendant argued any size limitation in the lease is inferior to 
the OCC orders allowing the drilling of the Katie 1509.
51
 
                                                                                                             
 45. Id. at 532. 
 46. Tucker v. Special Energy Corp., 2008 OK 57, ¶ 9,187 P.3d 730, 733. 
 47. Grayhorse Energy, LLC v. Crawley Petroleum Corp., 2010 OK CIV APP 145, ¶ 11, 
245 P.3d 1249, 1254.  
 48. Cory v. Newfield at 3. 
 49. Id. at 4. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
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The court rejected this argument by noting the OCC orders did not 
“prevent” Defendant from complying with the size limitation in the lease.  
Order No. 164538 and Order No. 665651 allowed Defendant to drill the 
Katie 1509, but they did not require Defendant to do so.  Therefore, the 




Next, Defendant argued it “did not voluntarily pool an area greater than 
160 acres” so it could drill the Katie 1509.  As the owner of 100% of the 
working interest in Section 36, Defendant claimed it did really pool  lands 
together because it did not need to obtain a pooling order from the OCC.  




The court explained it did not have to determine whether or not 
Defendant engaged in pooling because the lease also prevented Defendant 
from “combining” the leased premises with any other acreage.  The court 
ruled the lease precluded the drilling of an oil well on a unit larger than 160 
acres regardless of whether any pooling occurred, and Defendant did not 




Turning to Plaintiffs’ bad faith claim, Defendant argued Oklahoma 
courts do not recognize a cause of action for pooling in bad faith.  The court 
agreed, noting breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing results in 
damages for breach of contract, not independent tort liability.  A tort action 
may be available if the parties are in a “special relationship,” but Oklahoma 
courts have held an oil and gas lease does not give rise to such a 
relationship.  Therefore, the court granted Defendant’s motion regarding 
Plaintiffs’ bad faith claim.
55
 
In the end, this court allowed Plaintiffs to proceed with their claims to 
quiet title and for breach of contract, but denied their claims for tortious 
interference with contract and bad faith. 
Crawley Petroleum Corp. v. Gastar Exploration Inc., 2020 WL 2545327 
(W.D. Oklahoma 2020) 
Does the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (the “OCC”) have the 
jurisdiction to issue a pooling order covering a section where the land is 
                                                                                                             
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 5. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 5-6. 
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already subject to a joint operating agreement?  And does a joint operating 
agreement covering “wells” include both vertical and horizontal wells?
56
 
Both parties own leasehold working interests in a section in Kingfisher 
County, Oklahoma.  Also, they are both parties to a 1971 joint operating 
agreement (the “1971 JOA”).  While the 1971 JOA is still in effect, 
Plaintiff argued it applies to all wells in a specific area, while Defendant 
argued it only applies to vertical wells, not horizontal wells.
57
 
Early in 2017, both parties proposed drilling a horizontal well.  
Plaintiff’s proposal indicated it would send another letter if it determined 
Defendant had an interest subject to an operating agreement.  Then Plaintiff 
sent a second letter detailing its belief that Defendant had an interest subject 
to the 1971 JOA.  Defendant’s proposal did not reference the 1971 JOA.
58
 
The OCC issued a spacing order and a pooling order covering the 
Mississippian (less Chester) and Woodford common sources of supply, and 
named Defendant as operator for a single horizontal well for the section.  




Plaintiff elected to participate in the horizontal well with that portion of 
its interest that was not subject to the 1971 JOA.  Then, Plaintiff promised 
to make a separate election as to that portion of its interest that was subject 
to the 1971 JOA, but only if Defendant made a proposal based on the 1971 
JOA.  Defendant never made such a proposal because it did not believe the 
agreement covered horizontal wells.  In December 2017, Defendant 
completed the Yogi 1801 8-1UOH horizontal well.
60
 
Plaintiff filed suit in the District Court for Kingfisher County, and 
Defendant removed the case to federal court.  Plaintiff asked for a 
declaratory judgment that the 1971 JOA “controls the drilling, completion 
and operation of the [relevant] Horizontal Well and [that Plaintiff’s] 
leasehold interests subject to the [1971] JOA cannot be force pooled 
pursuant to the [OCC’s] Pooling Order.”  Plaintiff also asserted a claim for 
breach of the 1971 JOA.
61
 
The court noted this case turns on whether the 1971 JOA covers vertical 
and horizontal wells, or just vertical wells.  Plaintiff pointed out the 1971 
                                                                                                             
 56. Crawley Petroleum Corp. v. Gastar Exploration Inc., 2020 WL 2545327 (W.D. 
Oklahoma 2020). 
 57. Id. at 1. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 2. 
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JOA references “all wells.”  Defendant argued that because of technological 
advances, it is common sense to treat it as only covering vertical wells, 
because how could the parties intend for the agreement to cover something 




The court explained the Plaintiff has the “better legal argument.”
63
  The 
1971 JOA repeatedly refers to “well” and “wells” without more detail.  It 
does not show an intent to only cover vertical wells.  Therefore, the court 
ruled the 1971 JOA covers both vertical and horizontal wells. 
The court cited longstanding rules of contract interpretation that insist a 
court determine the intent of the parties to the contract.  A court may not 
read words into a contract that are not there, which is why this court refused 




Defendant argued Okla. Stat. tit. 15, §164 states a contract can only 
cover things which the parties intended to include.
65
  The court noted the 
1971 JOA references oil and gas wells, and §164 would  be relevant if the 
parties were now intending to drill a drinking water well.
66
  
Since the court found the 1971 JOA applies to both vertical and 
horizontal wells, Plaintiff’s interests subject to the agreement are outside 
the scope of the OCC orders.  The OCC Pooling Order granted elections to 
parties who had “not agreed with Operator to develop said unit and 
common sources of supply.”
67
  The 1971 JOA was an agreement to develop 
an area within the area covered by the OCC Pooling Order. 
Defendant argued the OCC Pooling Order “undisputedly and 
unequivocally” demonstrates the OCC determined the parties had not 
reached such an agreement: 
Applicants are the owners of the right to drill wells on said 
drilling and spacing unit and to develop and produce said 
common sources of supply, [and they] have made a bona fide 
effort to reach an agreement with all of the other such owners in 
such drilling and spacing unit, as set forth on Exhibit “A,” to 
pool their interests and to develop the drilling and spacing unit 
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and common sources of supply as a unit, and the Commission 
should issue an order requiring such owners to pool and develop 
the drilling and spacing unit and common sources of supply 
covered hereby as a unit.
68
 
However, the court noted the Pooling Order states Plaintiff and 
Defendant attempted to reach an agreement with all of the other owners; it 
does not state that no agreement was reached by the parties with any other 
owner.  The court added their decision could be different if the Pooling 
Order included the following language: “Applicant has not agreed with all 
[or any] of the other such owners in such drilling and spacing unit to pool 
their interests and to develop the drilling and spacing unit and common 
source of supply as a single unit.”
69
  While that language is included in 
some pooling orders, it was not included in this Pooling Order. 
Also, since some of Plaintiff’s interests within the section are subject to 
the 1971 JOA and some are outside the boundaries of the agreement, the 
OCC still has jurisdiction to issue a pooling order covering those interests 
that are not subject to the 1971 JOA.
70
  Therefore, the court granted 
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